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Abstract
This paper proposes a new methodology for generating sovereign credit
ratings. These are determined by mapping the probability that the debt-
GDP ratio might exceed a maximum debt limit at some point in the
future into a credit rating. The debt limit can be either ad hoc or based
on the nancial ability of a government to change scal policy in the
future to meet its outstanding obligations. When applied to quarterly
U.S. data from 1970 to 2011, two clear instances are found in which the
U.S. sovereign credit rating would have been downgraded on this basis:
during the 1970s oil crisis and in the aftermath of the Lehman collapse in
2008. This result is robust to several alternative views on the maximum
borrowing capacity of the U.S. economy.
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1 Introduction
Credit ratings for both private sector and sovereign debt have come under in-
tense scrutiny since the onset of the 2008 nancial crisis. Credit rating agencies
(CRAs) have been criticized for failing to identify the amount of risk accumu-
lated by mortgage-backed securities in the United States during the lending
boom of the 2000s. Following the recent downgrades of a number of eurozone
sovereigns, CRAs have been accused of exacerbating the eurozone debt crisis
and contributing to the rise of the cost of borrowing above sustainable levels in
several European countries.
In 2011, concerns about the adequacy of the operating procedures of the
leading CRAs have been expressed by the Security and Exchange Commission
in a report on the CRAsability to make timely and accurate disclosures, and
to allay fears about potential conicts of interest.1 At the same time, the
European Commission issued a proposal for stricter rules for CRAs to make
them more transparent, accountable and to increase competition in the sector.
The Commissions proposal stressed the role of conict of interest, political
interference and ine¢ ciencies in existing CRAs methodologies. It also suggested
the creation of an European ratings foundation in order to counter the inuence
of U.S.-based CRAs and that individual investors should determine their own
independent evaluation of credit ratings (European Commission, 2011).2 In his
review of the regulatory structure of CRAs, White (2010) also argues in favor
of investors seeking their own independent assessment of the credit rating as a
way of reducing reliance on CRAs. It is widely thought, however, that it would
be too costly for individual investors to make their own credit evaluations. Cost
is also the major reason why the European Commission abandoned its plan to
create a new CRA.
The aim of this paper is to show how it would be possible to provide mea-
sures of sovereign credit ratings that are transparent, independent and timely.
Transparency refers to the ease of the general public to access and to reproduce
credit ratings, and to the ability of the public to make its own judgments about
their validity. Independence reects the derivation of sovereign credit ratings
that are model-based rather than driven by the subjective evaluation of analysts.
The evaluation can be updated systematically using the latest available data,
and is timely for this reason. The measure is inexpensive to produce, and can
even be automated. Given these properties, we argue that such a procedure can
provide benchmark statistics for sovereign credit ratings that could be especially
useful not only for individual investors and independent (national and supra-
national) agencies, but also for policy makers and CRAs. Duan and Van Laere
(2012) recently argued that the provision of sovereign credit ratings for private
sector businesses is a public good that can be made available to nancial mar-
ket participants through the creation of a publicly-funded infrastructure. The
1See Security and Exchange Commission (2011)
2Similar reactions from policy makers and commentators were prompted following the
Latin American defaults in the early 1980s, the 1997 Asian banking crisis and the default of
Enron in 2001.
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model-based measure of the sovereign credit ratings serves a similar purpose but
without requiring the creation of expensive infrastructures.
The methodology is an adaptation to government debt of Mertons (1974)s
measure of distance-to-default and default probability. This has three key el-
ements: a forecast of the level of indebtedness over a given time horizon; an
estimate of the uncertainty surrounding this forecast; and a measure of the
maximum borrowing capacity of the sovereign country. We calculate the time-
varying forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio and their volatility using a VAR model
based on rolling-window estimation, hereafter a ROVAR model. Rolling-window
estimation, favoured by Stock andWatson (2007, 2008) and Orphanides and Wei
(2012) among the others, has the advantage of taking account of time-variation
in the VAR coe¢ cients and in their volatility over the sample period without
taking a specic stance on the source of time-variation. In this way forecasts of
the debt-GDP ratio, the uncertainty surrounding them and the implied default
probability may be up-dated each period. This procedure is computationally
inexpensive as the model can be estimated using standard classical methods.
Having determined the default probability prole, this can be mapped into a
credit rating using historic information on sovereign default probabilities and
credit ratings.
The analysis requires the denition of a debt threshold (debt-GDP limit)
beyond which a default event is assumed to occur. We implement two alternative
views about the default threshold. The rst, based on ad-hoc values, is entirely
agnostic about the economic rationale for the debt-GDP limit. Its usefulness
is in providing preliminary evidence on the likely values of the model-based
sovereign credit rating and on its sensitivity to forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio,
macroeconomic volatility and the debt threshold itself. The second employs a
real business cycle model with an elastic labor supply and distortionary taxation
to derive the debt-GDP limit. This is based on the notion that governments
default (either formally or de facto) only when they are not able to meet their
nancial obligations through using their scal instruments. We employ four
alternative denitions of the debt limit, depending on whether future scal
policy changes are anticipated or unanticipated and, in the second case, if they
stem from changes in expenditure policy, tax policy or both. We apply this
methodology to the U.S. sovereign credit rating for the period 1969:4 to 2011:2
for both ad-hoc and theory-based debt-GDP limits, constructing quarterly time-
series of credit ratings for short-term and long-term U.S. debt.
It might be argued that the use of a debt limit based exclusively on a gov-
ernments nancial ability to generate scal savings provides too narrow a view
of the borrowing capacity of a country, and that taking into account additional
factors might result in either higher or lower debt limits. A government could,
for example, either inate away its debt obligations or alter the maturity struc-
ture of debt. Credit ratings may also be inuenced by a countrys default history
and a governments willingness to meet its nancial obligations. There are two
main reasons why we choose not to incorporate these possible extensions into
our proposed methodology. First, it would signicantly complicate the analy-
sis. Second, adopting a narrow and specic view of the maximum borrowing
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capacity has the advantage that the resulting credit rating has an unambiguous
economic interpretation that can be easily communicated to investors and the
general public. Any di¤erences between the model-based and the o¢ cial credit
ratings might indicate the impact of factors, in addition to those associated
with scal policy, that have contributed to the subjective judgment of CRAs.
These discrepancies are likely to be smaller for advanced countries with stable
political, independent central banks committed to maintain price stability, and
scal authorities interested in retain reputation in sovereign bond markets, than
for other countries.3
U.S. Treasury securities have long been considered risk-free assets. Histor-
ically, they have received the highest credit-quality rating by all CRAs. Since
the latest global nancial crisis, however, both prominent economists (see, for
example, Buiter (2010)) and market participants have increasingly taken the
view that U.S. bonds are no longer risk-free assets. The change in the market
sentiment is reected in the fast-growing trend in the price of credit default
swaps (CDS) for U.S. sovereign bonds, an indicator of the markets perception
of the U.S. government creditworthiness.
This is illustrated very clearly in Figure 1 which shows the price of U.S.
Treasury securities CDSs over the three and half years (from January 2008 to
June 2011) before Standard & Poors downgraded the U.S. sovereign credit
rating by one notch from its highest ranking on August 5, 2011.4 Early in
2008, the 5-year U.S. sovereign CDSs traded below 10 basis points (bps). The
price rose substantially in July 2008 when IndyMac Bank collapsed, and rose
further in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and
AIG attempted to negotiate a bridging loan from the Federal Reserve. CDS
prices also increased in early 2009 to just below 100 bps and, after a sharp
decline to about 30 bps in the rst half of the 2009, again increased steadily.
By the end of June 2011 U.S. bonds CDS traded at about 51 bps, twice as
much as German sovereign CDS (26 bps) and close to that of Japan CDS (52
bps).5 Notwithstanding this sharp deterioration of the markets perception of
its creditworthiness over this period, U.S. government debt has received the
highest quality ranking by all CRAs during this period.6
In contrast, the model-based sovereign credit rating derived in this paper
appears to be more in line with the markets perception about the creditworthi-
ness of the U.S. government. The results suggest that the U.S. sovereign credit
3 In the U.S., as in most advanced countries, honouring sovereign debt is a constitutional
obligation. This was recently restated by the U.S. Treasurys General Counsel George W.
Madison, see The New York Times, July 8 2011.
4The data are from Datastream (Thomson Reuters CDS), accessed on July 11, 2012. The
sample includes daily observations from January 7, 2008 to June 30, 2011. No data on U.S.
sovereign CDS is available prior January 2008. The U.S. macroeconomic data is only available
up to 2011:2, therefore dening the end of the CDS sample period.
5On July 11, 2012, the 5-year CDSs were traded at about 47 bps, while the price on German
CDS was about 32 bps and that of Japan CDS is 59 bps.
6 In 2011, the main CRAs (Fitch Ratings, Moodys and Standard & Poors) expressed
concern about the medium-term perspectives of the U.S. scal outlook and lowered the outlook
of the U.S. sovereign debt to negative. All three CRAs also began issuing warnings about a
possible (though limited to one or two notches) downgrade of the U.S. sovereign credit rating.
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rating would have been of the highest quality for most of the last 40 years with
the exception of two periods where the credit rating is lower: the oil crisis in
the early 1970s and in the aftermath of IndyMac Bank and Lehman Brothers
collapse. The extent and duration of these downgrades depend on the level of
the debt-GDP limit, and in no case does the credit rating fall to speculative
grade. The di¤erences between the model-based and the o¢ cial credit ratings
illustrate the point made earlier, that factors other than the ability of to gener-
ate scal savings may have inuenced the judgment of the CRAs in these two
instances. A possible explanation for the di¤erences between the credit ratings
of the early 1970s is that the Fed printed money to purchase U.S. Treasury se-
curities. A major factor a¤ecting the o¢ cial credit ratings in the post-Lehman
period discrepancy is likely to be condence that the U.S. government would
honour its nancial liabilities. Nonetheless, the U.S. credit rating was down-
graded in 2011:3, an event anticipated by about two years by the model-based
credit rating.
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Fig. 1. U.S. sovereign CDS, mid rate spread. Source: Datastream (July
2012).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to attempt to use macro-
economic models to determine sovereign credit ratings. As outlined in sections
2 and 3, there is a large theoretical literature on sovereign default risk, but little
attention has been paid to how this translates into a sovereign credit rating.
The empirical literature on sovereign credit rating has focused either on deter-
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mining good predictors of o¢ cial sovereign credit ratings, or how (and to what
extent) nancial markets and macroeconomic variables react to changes in sov-
ereign credit ratings. In contrast to this literature, this paper seeks to provide
an alternative measure of credit ratings to those of the CRAs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some background infor-
mation on sovereign credit ratings and the methodologies followed by CRAs.
Section 3 discusses how we map the probability of default into credit ratings.
Section 4 describes how we adapt Mertons model in order to compute sovereign
default probability. Section 5 species the ROVAR model used for the deriva-
tion of the debt-GDP forecasts and their uncertainty. Section 6 carries out a
preliminary analysis of the U.S. sovereign credit rating by combining estimates
from the ROVAR with ad-hoc values of the debt-GDP limit. Section 7 assesses
various di¤erent measures of the debt-GDP limit obtained from a standard dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and recalculates the U.S.
sovereign credit rating. In Section 8 we summarize the methodology, the main
results and draw some conclusions about its use. In the paper we refer to four
appendices, which are available in the working paper version of this article,
see Polito and Wickens (2012, b). Appendix A describes the ROVAR model.
Appendix B provides details of the data. Appendix C includes details on the
solution of the DSGE model used for the determination of the theory-based
default limits. Appendix D describes the algorithm used for computing the
distribution of the steady-state values of the theory-based debt-GDP limits.
2 Sovereign credit ratings and the CRAspro-
cedures
A sovereign credit rating is broadly dened as an opinion about the likelihood
of default of a government, based on the perceived ability and willingness of the
government to meet its nancial obligations.7 A government is able to repay
its debt when it can change its policy to generate enough savings to service
its obligations. Whether a government wants to repay its liabilities depends
on a number of factors that go beyond the ability to generate revenue. These
include the existence of binding constraints to enforce debt repayment, sovereign
reputation, whether debt holders are either domestic or foreigners, the maturity
structure of government debt and the share of government debt held by domestic
banks.8
7This section draws on Gaillard (2012).
8The distinction between willingness and ability to pay debt, rst highlighted by Eaton
and Gersovitz (1981), is also central in the economic literature. The literature on willingness
initially looked at the role of sanctions (Sachs, 1984), sovereign reputation (Eaton and Fer-
nandez, 1995) and asymmetric information (Gertler and Rogo¤, 1990) for the assessment of
sovereign risk. More recent contributions have pointed out the role of debt maturity (Cole
and Kehoe, 2000) and secondary markets (Broner, Martin and Ventura, 2010) in determining
sovereign default events. There is a vast economic literature on the theoretical determinants
of the ability to pay and its empirical measurement. Polito and Wickens (2012, a) provide an
up-to-date survey.
6
The denition of a sovereign credit rating has evolved over time. CRAs
currently view a sovereign credit rating as being closely related to a governments
ability to meet its nancial obligations. The main CRAs also issue separate
sovereign recovery ratings for government bonds that reect the willingness to
repay debt. Credit ratings are assigned both to countries and bonds. The former
reects a governments overall nancial capacity to pay its nancial obligations;
the latter measures the quality of securities issued by a country. In addition to
evaluating countries and bonds over the long period, CRAs also assign short-
term ratings to sovereign issuers and short-term bonds, where short-term is
deemed to be a period of time of 12 months or less.
Although they vary across CRAs and have changed considerably over time,
sovereign rating methodologies are ultimately based on the individual judgments
of rating analysts. For example, no CRA uses a mathematical formula or an
economic model to measure the credit rating. Instead, CRAs have sovereign risk
units in charge of assigning new credit ratings and of monitoring and reviewing
the existing ratings. Ratings are issued following a request for a rating made
by a sovereign country.9 The CRAs team of analysts meets with the leading
o¢ cials of a country, collects data and then formulates a preliminary rating
recommendation, which is subsequently ratied (via a voting system) by the
members of a rating committee within the CRA. The resulting rating is rst
notied to the issuer and then disseminated to the public through the media.
Fitch Ratings and Standard & Poors allow the rating issued by the rating com-
mittee to be appealed before dissemination, while Moodys does not. Economic
and political factors and qualitative and quantitative criteria are employed by
the CRAs to determine the credit rating. Their use vary across CRAs and this
has changed over time. No information is provided on how each criterion and
variable is weighted in the nal determination of the overall credit rating.10
3 Credit ratings and the probability of default
Credit ratings reect the probability of default. In order to translate our mea-
sure of the probability of default we require a mapping of the probability of
default into a credit rating. This may be derived from data made available by
the CRAs on the historic experience of may countries. The rst three columns
in Table 3 summarize the letter-rating scale that we employ as a benchmark
for the numerical analysis. This includes 19 categories ranging from Aaa (high-
est quality and minimum credit risk) to C (lowest quality assigned to bonds
or countries already in default). Ratings from Aaa to Baa3 are termed invest-
ment grade, whereas ratings below Baa3 are categorized as speculative grade.
9Originally CRAs were paid by market investors for issuing credit rating (the so-called
"subscriber-pays" model). Since the early 1990s, however, CRAs are paid for their services
directly by sovereign countries ("issuer-pays" model).
10There is an extensive empirical literature on the determinants, accuracy and e¤ects of
sovereign credit ratings, in particular with reference to developing countries. Examples include
Eichengreen and Porters (1986); Cantor and Packer (1996); Ferreira and Gama (2007); Hill,
Brooks and Fa¤ (2010); Afonso, Gomes and Rother (2011) and Chen et al. (2013).
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Table 1
Sovereign credit rating scale and cumulative default probabilities.
Rating Cumulative default probability
Category Long-term Short-term 1-year 5-year 10-year average
Investment Aaa Prime - 1 4.99E-4 4.99E-4 4.99E-4 4.99E-4
grade Aa1 Prime - 1 0.026 0.245 0.317 0.208
Aa2 Prime - 1 0.053 0.490 0.634 0.415
Aa3 Prime - 1 0.079 0.736 0.952 0.623
A1 Prime - 1 0.106 0.981 1.269 0.830
A2 Prime - 1/2 0.132 1.226 1.586 1.038
A3 Prime - 1/2 0.159 1.471 1.903 1.245
Baa1 Prime - 2 0.185 1.717 2.221 1.453
Baa2 Prime- 2 or 3 0.212 1.962 2.538 1.660
Baa3 Prime-3 0.238 2.207 2.855 1.868
Speculative Ba1 Not Prime 0.415 3.950 8.197 3.942
grade Ba2 Not Prime 0.592 5.692 13.540 6.017
Ba3 Not Prime 0.769 7.435 18.882 8.092
B1 Not Prime 1.643 9.989 20.785 10.196
B2 Not Prime 2.517 12.542 22.687 12.299
B3 Not Prime 3.391 15.096 24.590 14.403
Caa Not Prime 10.139 21.005 27.334 19.607
Ca Not Prime 16.888 26.914 30.079 24.812
C Not Prime 23.636 32.823 32.823 30.016
This table reports the letter-rating scale employed for the numerical analysis and the corresponding
cumulative default probabilities after 1, 5 and 10 years. The last column includes the average
cumulative default probability over the 10-year horizon. The default probabilities are calculated by
interpolating original data available from Moodys (www.moodys.com).
Short-term ratings are related to long-term ratings and range from Prime, which
implies minimum credit risk for obligations of short-term maturity (further dis-
tinguished in Prime-1, Prime-2 and Prime-3) to Not Prime.11 CRAs provide
separate ratings for debt issued in local currency (LC) or in foreign currency
(FC). For the purpose of this paper we abstract from this distinction; while this
is particularly relevant for emerging economies, it is less important for advanced
economies like the U.S. Recent evidence suggests that LC and FC sovereign
credit ratings have converged over time with the main CRAs currently regard-
ing governments equally likely to default on both domestic and foreign liabilities
(see Gaillard 2011, p24).
In mapping default probabilities into a credit rating we proceed as though
a credit rating reects exclusively the ability of a government to repay debt as
11Although this rating scale is closely related to that currently employed by Moodys, it also
approximates the grading scales employed by other CRAs. The actual rating scale used by
Moodys includes 21 categories as the Caa rating is split into Caa1, Caa2 and Caa3. Fitchs
scale includes 24 categories from AAA to D, while S&P scale is based on 23 categories from
AAA to D.
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measured through the probability of default. We have noted that there is not a
clear-cut denition of sovereign credit rating, but by associating credit ratings
with this denition of the probability of default we obtain a rating consistent
with the current orientation of the main CRAs.
The nal four columns of Table 3 report the cumulative probability of de-
fault after one, ve, ten years as well as the unweighted average for a 10-year
period associated to each of the 19 letter grades. The 1-year scale is used later
to derive the measure of the short-term rating, while the 5-year, 10-year and
average scales are used to measure long-term ratings. The default probabil-
ities are derived by interpolating through annual data on 10-year cumulative
default probabilities and the corresponding sovereign credit ratings over the pe-
riod 1983-2011 available in Moodys (2011).12 Similar tables are provided by
Standard & Poors and Fitch Ratings. The table shows a clear negative relation
between the sovereign credit rating and the probability of default. For example,
a Baa rating implies a probability of default of 2.207 per cent by the end of year
5, while a Ba rating is linked to a higher cumulative default probability (7.435
per cent) over the same period of time.
The accuracy and interpretation of the default probabilities in Table 3 re-
quire further comment. The default probabilities taken from Moodys (2011) are
calculated by forming cohorts of sovereign issuers on the basis of their original
ratings and then dividing the number of defaults in the cohort over a specic
period of time by the initial size of the cohort. They therefore provide an ex-
post measure of the default probability that is not entirely consistent with that
required by an ex-ante analysis of the sovereign credit rating. Concerning their
reliability, the data in Table 3 may understate the default probability prole at-
tached to each credit rating as they exclude the default episodes that occurred
between World War I and World War II, and from the second half of the 1970s
to the early 1980s. It is also possible that these data may overstate the probabil-
ity of sovereign default probability as they are based on actual default episodes
which include instances of the inability and unwillingness to repay debt.
Nonetheless, in our view, the historical default probabilities represent the
best option available for mapping the probability of sovereign default into a
12The original data cannot be used directly because they are available on an annual basis
and only for Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and Caa-C ratings. In addition a zero-default probability is
attached to Aaa-A ratings for the whole 10-year horizon and Aaa-Baa ratings for the 1-year
horizon. We use a two-stages linear interpolation to retrieve this missing information. First,
we interpolate vertically (for each year) to derive the default probability associated with each
of the 19 letter grades.We assume that the available ratings - Aa, A, Baa, Ba, B and Caa-C
- correspond respectively to Aa3, A3, Baa3, Ba3, B3 and C in table 3. We also replace the
value of 0 for Baa in year 1 with 0.476/2, i.e. half of the value in the following year. This
initial interpolation has the e¤ect of assigning, for each year, nonzero default probabilities
for ratings Aaa-Baa3 in year 1, and ratings Aaa-A3 in subsequent years. Having derived a
mapping of the probability of default into credit ratings in each of the 10 years, we then derive
a quarterly mapping for the whole 10-year period by a further interpolation.This second round
of interpolation is carried out assuming that in the rst year the default probability at the
beginning of the rst quarter is 0. We have also replaced the default probabilities at the end of
the rst year for Aaa ratings from 0.000E-20 to 4.99E-4, as the model typically yields nonzero
default probability for Aaa ratings.
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sovereign credit rating. CRAs also publish default probabilities associated with
corporate credit ratings. These would also su¤er of the same limitations as
sovereign ratings. Moreover, as sovereign defaults occur less frequently than
corporate defaults, corporate default rates cannot be used to map sovereign
credit ratings. Rather than use historic data, one could specify a rating scale
based on pre-dened cumulative default probabilities. This would, however, be
an ad hoc choice and there is no good reason to prefer it to that based on historic
data.
In the following sections we describe and implement a model for computing
ex-ante default probabilities over a 10-year forecast period. The model-based
measure of the sovereign credit rating is then obtained by comparing the ex-ante
default probabilities with the ex-post values in Table 3.
4 Measuring the probability of sovereign default
The conceptual framework for the determination of the probability of sovereign
default is adapted for use on government debt from Mertons (1974) model of
credit risk. The starting point is the one-period government budget constraint
(GBC) which describes the intertemporal dynamics of government debt. Ex-
pressed as a proportion of nominal GDP, the GBC can be written as:
dt
yt
+ (1 + t)
bt 1
yt 1
=
bt
yt
; (1)
where yt is real GDP, dtyt is the primary decit-GDP ratio, t is the output-
adjusted real interest rate on government debt and btyt is the debt-GDP ratio.
The primary decit dtyt is dened as the di¤erence between government expen-
diture in goods and services ( gtyt ) plus transfers (
zt
yt
), both expressed as a pro-
portion of GDP, and the government revenue-GDP ratio ( vtyt ). The discount
rate t is the nominal interest rate on government bonds (i
b
t) less the ination
rate (t) and the growth rate of GDP (t). By expanding the variable
dt
yt
to
include seigniorage revenue, equation (1) can also represent the consolidated
government budget constraint . Dening t = 11+t as the one period discount
factor, the h-period ahead forward solution to the GBC is:
bt
yt
=  Et
hX
s=1
dt+s=yt+s
sj=1t+j
+ Et
bt+h=yt+h
hj=1t+j
; (2)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation conditional on information
available at time t. Given a target level of the debt-GDP ratio bt+hyt+h , this equa-
tion can be written as
bt
yt
+ Et
hX
s=1
dt+s=yt+s
sj=1t+j
  Et bt+h=yt+h
hj=1t+j
= Et
bt+h=yt+h
hj=1t+j
  Et bt+h=yt+h
hj=1t+j
:
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This measures the deviation of the discounted value of the future debt-GDP
ratio (equivalent to the sum of the current debt-GDP ratio and the present
value of future expected primary surpluses) from the discounted value of the
debt-GDP target.13
To measure the probability of sovereign default we reinterpret the target
debt-GDP ratio as a default threshold reecting either the willingness or the
ability of a government to meet its nancial obligations. Default is presumed
if the expected value of the debt-GDP ratio exceeds this threshold level. The
default threshold is interpreted as the market (or an analysts) expectation
of the value of the debt-GDP ratio beyond which the debt cannot be rolled
over, thereby bringing about a default event. A default event occurs when the
government fails to make scheduled payments (either partially or in full) on the
principal or the interest. Typically, this leads to a modication of the terms of
the debt contract which either reduces the value of the bonds issued, or extends
their maturity, or reduces the interest rate.
To implement this we use the h-period ahead solution of the GBC in equation
(2) given by
bt+h
yt+h
=  
hX
j=1

js=1
 
1 + t+s
 dt+j
yt+j

+hs=1
 
1 + t+s
 bt
yt
;
where the right-hand side is the cumulative saving generated by current and
future primary surpluses from t to t+h plus the interest cost of rolling-over the
current debt-GDP ratio until period t+ h.
The probability of sovereign default by period t + h (hazard rate) is the
probability of not defaulting prior to year t+h but defaulting in year t+h, and
hence is given by
pt;t+h = pt+h (1  pt+h 1) (1  pt+h 2) ::: (1  pt+1) ; (3)
where pt+h denotes the probability of defaulting in period t+h given information
up to period t. This is measured by
pt+h = Pr
0@  hX
j=1

js=1
 
1 + t+s
 dt+j
yt+j

+hs=1
 
1 + t+s
 bt
yt
 bt+h
yt+h
j bt
yt
=
b
y
1A ;
where Pr (:) could be either an empirical density function or assumed to be a
known theoretical distribution.14 Hence,
pt+h = Pr

bt+h
yt+h
 bt+h
yt+h
jt

; (4)
13This equation is at the basis of numerous short- and medium-term indicators of the scal
stance proposed in the economic literature and used by policy makers; for example, the tax-gap
indicators pioneered by Blanchard (1990) and Blanchard et al. (1990); the S1 and S2 indicators
in European Commission (2007), the projections of the scal stance in Congressional Budget
O¢ ce (2010), and model-based measures of the scal stance proposed by Polito and Wickens
(2011) and Polito and Wickens (2012, a).
14To implement the credit rating we assume a normal distribution.
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where Pr (:) is assumed to be the normal probability density function and t
denotes information available at time t. The debt-GDP ratio at time t+1 may
be decomposed into
bt+1
yt+1
= Et
bt+1
yt+1
+ t+1
where Et
bt+1
yt+1
is the expectation of the debt-GDP ratio by the end of period
t + 1 conditional on information available in t, and t+1 is the corresponding
innovation in period t+ 1. The latter may be written as
t = t"t;
where "t  i:i:d: (0; 1). It then follows that the debt-GDP ratio for period t+ h
may be written as
bt+h
yt+h
= Et
bt+h
yt+h
+ t+h
t+h = 
h
s=1t+s
where Vt(t+h) = 
2
;t+h = 
h
s=1
2
t+s is the conditional variance of the debt-
GDP ratio.
The probability of sovereign default in period t + h given information in
period t is therefore
pt+h = Pr
  DDt+h  t+hjt ; (5)
with
t+h =
t+h
;t+h
and
DDt+h =
Et
bt+h
yt+h
  bt+hyt+h
;t+h
(6)
denoting the distance-to-default of sovereign debt, a measure, in terms of stan-
dard deviations, of the size of the increase in the expected debt-GDP ratio
between t and t + h that would cause default in period t + h. The probability
of default increases due to a narrowing of Et
bt+h
yt+h
  bt+hyt+h , to the gap between
the expected debt-GDP ratio and the default threshold level, and to increased
uncertainty surrounding the forecasts of the debt-GDP ratio (t+h). As the
base year changes, causing changes in the estimates of the conditional expecta-
tion and variance of the debt-GDP ratio, this probability will change over time.
From equation (3), the cumulative default probability (i.e. the probability of
default in any period between t and t+ h) is
pct;t+h =
hX
j=1
pt;t+j ; (7)
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which is calculated assuming a standard cumulative normal distribution. This
provides a measure of the cumulative default probability compatible with that
used in Table 3.
To summarize, equations (5) and (6) show that three fundamental pieces
of information are required to measure the probability of sovereign default: a
forecast of the debt-GDP ratio over a specic time-horizon, an estimate of the
uncertainty surrounding this forecast, and a value for the debt-GDP default
threshold. The rst two may be determined from a macroeconomic model of
the economy. This is described in the next section.
5 Forecasting sovereign debt and volatility
5.1 The model
An economic analysis of the probability of sovereign default and credit ratings
requires the specication of a model of the economy in order to forecast the
future evolution of the debt-GDP ratio. This could be a structural model of the
economy such as a DSGE model or, as in this section, a time series model such
as VAR.
In an analysis of the forecasting properties of DSGE models Wickens (2014)
has shown that there is little di¤erence in the forecasting properties of DSGE
and VAR models. Both forecast well when the economy is growing smoothly
but forecast badly when the economy experiences turning points. One reason
for poor forecasts from DSGE models is the di¢ culty of forecasting exogenous
variables for which, by denition, there is no theory and so they must be forecast
by time series models. The reason why an unrestricted VAR model forecasts as
well as a DSGE model is that when the exogenous variables are represented by
a VAR, the solution to a DSGE model is a restricted VAR. If these restrictions
are correct then the forecasts from a DSGE model will have smaller forecast
error variances than those from an unrestricted VAR, but if the restrictions are
incorrect then an unrestricted VAR will give less biased forecasts.
There are further advantages to using a VAR. It is theory-free and is easy
to implement empirically, both of which are attractive features for market par-
ticipants seeking to determine their own credit-rating measure. In order to
improve the forecasting performance we take account of the uncertainty arising
from changes in the processes generating the exogenous variables and any vari-
ations in the parameters by estimating the VAR using a rolling-window data
period, or ROVAR. Rolling analyses of time-series models are often used in -
nance to assess a models stability over time. Stock and Watson (2007, 2008)
have used rolling-window estimation to forecast U.S. ination, while Orphanides
and Wei (2012) have demonstrated the e¤ectiveness of rolling-window estima-
tion in capturing time-variation in the parameters and (the volatility of) the
residuals in macro-nance models. Recently, Canova and Ferroni (2012) have
employed rolling samples to evaluate within a medium-scale DSGE model the
impact of policy shocks on the dynamic of ination. Using a ROVAR it is easy
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and simple to continually up-date the probability distribution of the debt-GDP
ratio on the latest data.
An alternative type of VAR to a ROVAR could also be used. In the mon-
etary policy literature on the determinants of the great acceleration and the
great moderation Primiceri (2005) has used a reduced form VAR with time-
varying parameters and stochastic volatility (TVP-SV-VAR), and Sims and
Zha (2006) have used a VAR with Markow-switching parameters and volatil-
ity (MS-VAR). There are, however, two main drawbacks to these VAR models.
First, they can only be estimated using Bayesian methods as the analytical
form of the likelihood function is not tractable under the assumption that the
covariance structure of the shocks follows a stochastic volatility process. Even
then, the estimation is generally not straightforward as it depends crucially on
the specic assumptions made about the priors; it is also time-intensive, espe-
cially for medium- and large-scale models. Second, forecasts and measures of
uncertainty from both the TVP-SV-VAR and the MS-VAR are inuenced by
the particular view taken of the process driving the variance structure of the
shocks, whether this is gradual, as in the TVP-SV-VAR, or driven by a Markow-
switching process, as in the MS-VAR. An agnostic view on volatility may be
preferable. Kapetanios et al. (2012) nds that during the latest nancial cri-
sis macroeconomic forecasts obtained from a ROVAR signicantly outperform
those the TVP-SV-VAR, while being in line with those from the MS-VAR. Fore-
casts from the three models are instead similar during periods of macroeconomic
stability.
Following the VAR literature on time-varying macroeconomic volatility, we
specify a ROVAR model with two lags and a constant term. This is estimated
using a moving-data window of 40 quarters. At each step of the estimation we
derive pseudo out-of-sample forecasts. In essence, we estimate the VAR using
data from t  40 until date t and then compute h period ahead point forecasts
and forecasts errors. These two steps are repeated until t reaches the end of the
sample.15 The vector of variables included in the ROVAR is
xt =
h
t t
dt
yt
bt
yt
rst r
l
t cpt
i
: (8)
The rst four variables - the growth rate of real GDP, the ination rate (GDP
deator), the primary decit-GDP ratio and the debt-GDP ratio - allow the
model to satisfy the GBC, equation (1).16 The variables rst and r
l
t measure the
Federal funds rate and long-term interest rate on government bonds respectively.
These capture the links between the debt-GDP dynamics, monetary policy and
the term structure. The last variable, cpt, is the growth rate of crude oil price,
used to proxy changes in commodity prices. This exogenous variable captures
the impact of global economic factors on the domestic macroeconomic and the
scal outlook. Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2008), pp.6 document that "peaks and
15Appendix A describes the specication of the ROVAR model and the determination of
the recursive forecasts with more details.
16This is because there is always an unique nominal rate ibt that satises (1) which it is not
therefore necessary to include explicitly in the model.
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troughs in commodity price cycles appear to be leading indicators of peaks and
troughs in the capital ow cycle, with troughs typically resulting in multiple
defaults".17 The specication of the variables in xt is typical of VAR analyses
of scal shocks and business cycle uctuations; see for example Fatas and Mihov
(2001), Canzonieri et al. (2002) and Chung and Leeper (2007).
5.2 Data and stylized facts
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Fig. 2. U.S. aggregate macroeconomic (left axis) and volatility (right axis)
1969:4-2011:2. St. Dev. is standard deviation of the 1-quarter ahead forecast
error from ROVAR model.
The data are quarterly for the U.S. from 1969:4 to 2011:2 and are shown in
Figure 2 (left axis). Four features of these data are worth bearing in mind when
interpreting the empirical analysis of the U.S. sovereign credit rating in the next
two sections. The rst is the so-called great macroeconomic acceleration and
moderation. This is reected in the higher growth rate of GDP, in the ination
rate and in nominal interest rates in the 1970s and early 1980s relative to the
post-1985 period. The second is the great deterioration of the scal stance
reected in the upward trend in the debt-GDP ratio since the early 1980s and
in the greater amplitude of swings in the primary decit-GDP ratio starting
from the second half of the 1980s.18 The third is the large fall of the growth
rate of GDP and further deterioration of the scal stance since the 2007-2009
global nancial crisis. The fourth feature is the large spike in oil ination that
17Full details on the data are in Appendix B.
18Like the great moderation, the great deterioration of the scal stance is also typical of
most of European countries, see Polito and Wickens (2011).
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occurred in the rst quarter of 1974, though the series appear to be stationary
throughout the 1970-2011 period.
Figure 2 (right axis) reports estimates of the time-varying volatility of the
variables included in the ROVAR, measured by the standard deviation of the
1-quarter ahead forecast error. The most striking feature is that over the past
40 years there have been large uctuations not only in the volatility of U.S.
macroeconomic variables (output, ination and interest rates) but also in the
volatility of scal and global variables. In addition, these uctuations appear
to be highly correlated. For example, the great moderation coincides with a
large fall in the volatility of the rate of change in oil prices. The volatility
of both output and ination has steadily (though not sharply) increased since
the late 1990s and this coincides with a gradual surge in the volatility in the
ination rate in oil prices over the same period. There is also a strong positive
correlation between the volatilities of global and scal variables. The volatility
of the scal variables (particularly the decit-GDP ratio) increased during the
1970s, declined during the 1980s, then increased during the 1990s and 2000s and
has picked again during the latest nancial crisis. This evidence highlights the
signicance of scal and global factors in determining domestic macroeconomic
volatility. It also points to the need to capture time-variation in macroeconomic
volatility in the forecasting model.
6 Credit ratings with ad-hoc debt limits
We now estimate the probability of default and map this into a credit rating
using ad-hoc time-invariant debt-GDP values as proxies for the default thresh-
old. We use these results as a benchmark. They abstract from considerations
about whether the debt limit reects the ability or the willingness of the U.S.
government to meet its nancial obligations, or about the impact on the sov-
ereign credit rating of time-varying debt-GDP limits. The latter is investigated
in the next section.
The sovereign credit rating is determined as follows. First we obtain time-
varying debt-GDP forecasts (Et
bt+h
yt+h
) and forecast-errors standard deviations
(;t+h) from the ROVAR for t ranging quarterly from 1969:4 to 2011:2 and
over a 10-year horizon, i.e. h = 1; :::; 40. We then use these to compute the
probability of default in each quarter of the forecasting horizon. As the ad-
hoc debt-GDP threshold does not change over time, e¤ectively, we compute the
probability of default in period t+ h from
pt+h = Pr
0@Et bt+hyt+h   by
;t+h
 t+h
1A : (9)
We have simulated the model over a wide range of debt-GDP limits, from 100
to 500 per cent, but for illustrative purposes report only the results obtained
for debt-GDP limits equal to 150, 200 and 300 per cent which are su¢ cient
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to highlight the main results.19 The corresponding hazard rates can then be
calculated using equation (3) and converted into cumulative default probabilities
using equation (7). Finally, the model-based measure of the credit rating is
derived by mapping this probability into an initial sovereign credit rating using
Table 3. As this may be too sensitive to swings in debt-GDP forecasts and
uncertainty, we later revise this initial rating to provide a smoother rating which
we call the nal rating.
6.1 Initial credit rating
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Fig. 3. Initial model-based U.S. sovereign credit rating (short and long term)
under ad-hoc debt-GDP limit, 1969:4-2011:2. Actual corresponds to Moodys
(2011) historical credit rating.
Figure 3 plots the initial model-based sovereign credit rating together with
the historic U.S. rating as reported in Moodys (2011). Short- and long-term
sovereign credit ratings are obtained by comparing the cumulative default prob-
ability prole derived from the model over horizons of 1 (top panel), 5 (middle
panel) and 10 years (bottom panel) with those corresponding to columns 4, 5
and 6 in Table 3. The short-term credit rating derived from the model is Prime 1
for the whole sample period, regardless of the default threshold. This coincides
19Sovereign credit ratings obtained from other values of the debt-GDP limit within the
100-500 per cent range can be made available upon request.
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with the actual rating, indicating that the model attaches a zero probability
to a U.S. default within 1-year over the whole sample period. For a 5-year
horizon the initial rating is lowered from Aaa to C in the rst two quarters of
1974 regardless of the debt-GDP limit. A downgrade from Aaa to C also occurs
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, though its
duration reduces as the debt-GDP limit increases.20 Using a 10-year horizon
the model gives the same downgrade in early 1974 as for the 5-year horizon,
but the downgrade to C is longer-lasting (for ve consecutive quarters, starting
from 2008:4) during the latest nancial crisis for any of the debt-GDP limits
considered. The model also lowers the credit rating in 2008:2 to C, Ba3 and
Aa1 if the debt-GDP limits are, respectively, 150, 200 and 300.21
6.2 Final credit rating
20This downgrade lasts four quarters (from 2008:4 to 2009:3) when b
y
= 150 per cent,
three quarters (2009:1-2009:3) when b
y
= 200 per cent and two quarters (2009:1-2009:2) with
b
y
= 300 per cent.
21With b
y
= 200 per cent, further downgrades from Aaa to Aa1 occur in 1987:1, 1992:2,
1993:1, 1997:2 and 1997:3. With the lowest debt-GDP threshold, b
y
= 150 per cent, the
model yields further downgrades from Aaa in 1970:1(to Aa1), 1987:1 (to Aa1), in the rst
two quarters of 1992 (to Aa1 and Baa1 respectively), during 1992:4-1993:2 (Aa1, C and Aa1
respectively), in 1997:2 (to Aa1). In addition, the credit rating remains at Aa1 from 2010:1
onward.
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Fig. 4. Final model-based U.S. sovereign credit rating (short and long term)
under ad-hoc debt-GDP limit, 1969:4-2011:2. Actual corresponds to Moodys
(2011) historical credit rating.
This initial sovereign credit rating is very sensitive to uctuations in the
debt-GDP forecast and may be very volatile especially during periods of high
macroeconomic instability. This is in contrast with the operating procedures of
CRAs, which typically revise sovereign credit ratings twice at year rather than
on a quarterly basis and place a sovereign credit rating under review in the short
term, perhaps before changing it later.22 Sovereign credit ratings, at least for
industrialized countries, tend to be altered gradually rather than suddenly.23
We therefore provide a nal sovereign credit rating, which is less volatile than
the initial credit rating, by imposing the constraint that quarterly changes in the
sovereign credit rating may occur only gradually. This is calculated each quarter
from the initial rating as follows: in the rst period of the sample the nal credit
rating is set equal to the initial credit rating; if the new initial credit rating (from
the second period onwards) is the same as the previous quarters initial rating,
the new nal rating is set equal to the previous quarters nal rating; if the new
initial credit rating is higher (lower) than the previous periods initial rating
then the new nal credit rating is upgraded (downgraded) by one notch.
22This is referred to creditwatch by S&P, watchlist by Moodys and ratingwatch
by Fitch. Possible rating changes can be either upgrade, or downgrade, or with uncertain
direction uncertain. Sovereign credit ratings also can be changed without being rst under
review.
23See Sovereign Bond Rating Histories, in Appendix III of Moodys (2011).
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The nal credit ratings are reported in Figure 4. We observe no change in the
nal short-term credit rating compared to the initial measure as this is Prime-
1 throughout. With a 5-year horizon, the model would have downgraded U.S.
sovereign debt from Aaa to Aa1 in 1974:1 and to Aa2 in 1974:2, regardless of the
debt-GDP limit, and it would have restored the Aaa credit rating gradually over
the next two quarters. The nal rating further downgrades U.S. debt during the
latest nancial crisis. The starting date and the magnitude of the downgrade
vary with the debt-GDP limit but, unlike the initial rating, in no case is the
U.S. credit rating lowered below speculative grade.24
Using a 10-year horizon has the e¤ect of deepening the reduction and dura-
tion of the downgrade during the latest nancial crisis. The lowest value reached
is A2 in 2009:4 regardless of the debt-GDP limit. With the lowest debt-GDP
limit the credit rating is lowered to A1 in 2008:1 but is restored to Aaa in the
following quarter. It then reduces to A2 in 2009:4 and reaches A1 in 2010:4
where it remains until 2011:2. The same pattern is found with the intermediate
and high debt-GDP limits, except that a Aaa rating is restored in 2011:2 and
2011:1. With a 150 per cent debt-GDP limit, minor downgrades occur in the
mid 1980s and during the 1990s; with the lowest debt-GDP limit, the credit
rating is lowered to Aa1 in 1987:1, 1992:1, 1992:3 1997:2 and 1997:3, and is Aa2
in 1992:2; and with the intermediate debt-GDP limit the credit rating is Aa1 in
1987:1, 1992:2, 1993:1, 1997:1 and 1997:2.
To summarize, the model-based nal sovereign credit rating identies two
episodes over the past 40 years in which U.S. debt would have been downgraded
if based on our measure: the rst coincides with the oil crisis starting in Oc-
tober 1973; the second coincides with the period after the collapse of IndyMac
Bank and Lehman Brothers. These ndings are generally robust to the speci-
cation of the debt-GDP limit within the range 150-300 per cent. The extent
and duration of the downgrade varies with the debt-GDP limit and the time
horizon. A mild downgrade is indicated following the earlier 1990s recession
and in the latest 1980s and 1990s. Clearly, the model-based measure of the
U.S. sovereign credit rating is related to key events of the U.S. macroeconomic
history, with downgrades typically being associated with episodes of economic
recessions, swings in commodity prices and large increase in government spend-
ing. This di¤er from the credit ratings issued by the main CRAs. As noted
in the introduction, the CRAs have given U.S. debt the highest credit rating
throughout the whole 1969:4-2011:2 period. Standard & Poor only lowered this
by one notch in its rating on August 5, 2011. This was about 12 quarters after
the collapse of IndyMac Bank and Lehman Brothers.
24With the lowest and intermediate debt-GDP limits, the credit rating is gradually lowered
from Aaa in 2008:3 to A1 in 2009:3 and recovers the Aaa status by 2010:3. With the 300
per cent debt-GDP limit, the credit rating is gradually lowered from Aaa in 2008:4 to Aa2 in
2009:2 and the Aaa rating is restored by 2009:4.
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7 Credit ratings with theory-based debt limits
7.1 The debt-GDP limit
The previous analysis of sovereign credit ratings is based on an ad-hoc choice
of the debt-GDP limit. We now consider a limit derived from the intertempo-
ral government budget constraint (IGBC) embedded in a microfounded DSGE
model of the economy. The debt-GDP limit may be obtained either directly from
the steady-state value of the IGBC, or by maximizing this with respect to tax
rates, or by minimizing the steady-state IGBC with respect to expenditure.25All
these notions of the maximum borrowing capacity compare the outstanding li-
abilities of the government with the market expectation of future saving that
the government can generate by either anticipated or unanticipated scal policy
changes. Default is deemed to occur whenever the present value of this expected
saving is lower than the existing debt-GDP ratio.
The starting point for the derivation of a debt-GDP limit is the one-period
GBC in equation (1). The solution to an innite horizon DSGE model con-
strains the government from rolling over its liabilities forever and implies that
the current period debt-GDP ratio must satisfy the intertemporal government
budget constraint limit (IGBCL) every period. Denoting this level of the debt-
GDP ratio as btyt
IGBCL
, the resulting equilibrium condition is
bt
yt
IGBCL
=  Et
1X
j=1
gt+j
yt+j
+
zt+j
yt+j
  vt+jyt+j ;
jY
s=1
 
1 + t+s
 ; (10)
where gt is government expenditures on goods and services, zt is transfers, vt is
government revenues and t is the discount rate dened earlier. The right-hand
side of equation (10) is the markets expectation of the present value of current
and future primary surpluses given information up to time t, and is a measure
of a governments borrowing capacity based on the markets anticipation of the
future evolution of scal policy.
Other measures of the debt-GDP limit exploit the fact that unanticipated
changes in scal policy may increase a governments ability to raise further debt.
25There are several alternatives to using the IGBC to measure the debt-GDP limit of a
government. The IGBC approach is related to Sachs (1989)s concept of debt La¤er curve
based on the notion of debt overhang, a situation where high debt levels (relative to the re-
payment capacity of a country) result in e¢ ciency losses due, for example, to rescheduling
negotiations of debt obligations, changes in trade patterns, or crowding out of investment.
The quantication of these costs is however not straightforward. Cole and Kehoe (2000)s
model of liquidity crisis can be used to derive a debt-GDP threshold below which govern-
ments are always solvent and default never occurs. However, default above this threshold is
undetermined as it is subject to whether a country can still avoid a liquidity crisis. There
is also an extensive empirical literature that quanties "safe" debt-GDP thresholds. These
however vary from country to country, change over time, and crucially depend on the default
history of a country (see, for example, Reinhart, Rogo¤ and Savastano (2003) for emerging
markets and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2011) for advanced economies).
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Unanticipated changes in policy are unpredictable: however market participants
can determine the maximum impact of any surprise change in government ex-
penditure and tax policy if these were to occur. This logic is at the basis of
three other denitions of the debt-GDP limit.
The rst is obtained by adapting Aiyagari (1994)s natural debt limit (NDL)
for government policy. In a DSGE model, the NDL corresponds to the repre-
sentative households wealth and comes from the requirement that it must be
feasible for the household to repay its state contingent debt in every possible
state by eliminating its expenditures. When applied to scal policy, the NDL is
obtained by setting to zero all sources of government expenditure in (10). The
implied debt-GDP limit, denoted by btyt
NDL
, then corresponds to the expected
present value of current and future tax revenue and is given by
bt
yt
NDL
= Et
1X
j=1
vt+j
yt+j
jY
s=1
 
1 + t+s
 : (11)
This debt-GDP limit precludes a government from being able to nance higher
debt levels from unanticipated reductions in expenditure; unanticipated in-
creases in tax revenues or changes in monetary policy must occur in order to
increase the debt-GDP limit.
The second debt limit has been suggested recently by Davig, Leeper and
Walker (2010, 2011) and Cochrane (2011). The starting point is the notion that
distortionary taxation implies that there exists a set of tax rates that maximizes
tax revenues. For this to happen taxes must satisfy a La¤er e¤ect. The debt-
GDP limit then emerges as the expected present value of future primary decits
under the assumption that tax revenue is maximized in each period and there
will be no unanticipated changes in the conduct of government expenditure
policy. Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) refer to this as the scal limit (FL).
This is given by
bt
yt
FL
= Et
1X
j=1
dt+j
yt+j
FL
jY
s=1
 
1 + t+s
 ; (12)
where
n
dt+j
yt+j
FL
=
gt+j
yt+j
+
zt+j
yt+j
  v
max
t+j
yt+j
o1
j=0
denotes the sequence of primary decit
achievable when government tax revenues are maximized. It disregards the po-
tential impact of unanticipated changes in government expenditure. Thus Davig,
Leeper and Walkers (2010) scal limit occurs when the government no longer
has the ability to increase its borrowing capacity by increasing tax revenues.
Nonetheless, it could still either change its expenditure policy or use monetary
policy, or both.
A further possibility is to maximize tax revenues whilst setting government
expenditure and transfers equal to zero in (12). This gives the maximum debt-
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GDP limit (MDL):
bt
yt
MDL
= Et
1X
j=1
vmaxt+j
yt+j
jY
s=1
 
1 + t+s
 : (13)
When the limit in (13) is reached, a government can the no longer use unantic-
ipated scal policy to nance more debt and would need to resort to monetary
policy.
Implementing these four measures of the debt-GDP limit presents a num-
ber of problems. For example, computation of the debt-GDP limit in equation
(10) may be problematic when using historic data from countries that have run
persistent decits in the past as the debt-GDP limit implied by the projection
of future decits may be negative. This point is illustrated in the next section.
The debt-GDP limits based on (11) and (13) are always positive and the maxi-
mization of tax revenue in (12) is also likely to produce a positive the debt-GDP
limit. The scal changes required to achieve the debt-GDP limits in (11), (12)
and (13) may not, however, be politically feasible.26
We implement the debt-GDP limits in equations (10), (11), (12) and (13)
by including distortionary taxation in an otherwise standard real business cycle
model with an elastic labor supply. Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) have
used a similar model to compute the debt-GDP limit for the U.S. economy,
but extended to include nominal rigidities. They assume that labor and capital
income are taxed at the same rate and do not consider revenue generated by
the taxation of consumption. This model is closely related to the neoclassical
growth model employed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) to estimate La¤er curves
for the U.S. and for individual EU countries. We depart from Davig, Leeper and
Walker (2010) in that we consider separately taxation on consumption, labor
and capital income. We also depart from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) because
we derive debt-GDP limits rather than La¤er hills alone. Another di¤erence is
that we use the model to derive a quarterly time series of debt-GDP limits over
the past 40 years by allowing taxes, expenditures and technological progress in
the U.S. to change and to have time-varying volatility.
7.2 The model
The model is dened in real terms. We assume that households derive utility
from consumption ct and leisure 1  nt, and want to maximize
E0
1X
t=0
tu (ct; 1  nt) ;
where E0 denotes a mathematical expectation conditioned on time 0 informa-
tion;  2 (0; 1) is the household discount factor; u (:) is a twice continuously
26Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010) discuss the use of logistic functions to compute feasible
debt-GDP limits. But this is beyond the scope of our paper.
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di¤erentiable, increasing, strictly concave utility function; and nt denotes labor.
Households face a sequence of budget constraints
(1 +  ct)ct + kt + bt = (1  nt )wtnt + [1 +
 
rkt   
  
1  kt

]kt 1
+
 
1 + rbt

bt 1 + zt;
where kt; bt, wt, rkt , r
b
t , zt, , 
c
t , 
n
t and 
k
t denote physical capital, government
bonds, wages, the gross real rate of return on capital, the real rate of return on
bonds, government transfers, the rate of physical depreciation of capital, a tax
rate on consumption, a tax rate on labor income and a tax rate on net income
from capital (as in Prescott (2002)). Output is generated by a Hicks-neutral
Cobb-Douglas production function
yt = Atk

t n
1 
t ;
where At denotes technological progress and  is the income share of capital.
The stock of physical capital evolves according to
kt   kt 1 = xt   kt 1;
where xt denotes investment. The government budget constraint (GBC) is
gt +
 
1 + rbt

bt 1 + zt = vt + bt
where gt is government expenditure on goods and services and vt =  ctct +
nt wtnt + 
k
t
 
rkt   

kt 1 is total tax revenue. As we treat the U.S. as a closed
economy, the national income identity is
yt = ct + gt + xt:
The model excludes the possibility that a government could inate away
its debt obligations. Although this may not be an appropriate assumption for
all countries, it is more suitable for the U.S. for the following reasons for this.
First, the scal consolidation strategies to reduce budget decits in advanced
economies recently proposed by the IMF explicitly exclude ination (seigniorage
revenue) as a policy instrument, see Cottarelli (2010). Second, in the U.S.,
monetary policy is been delegated to the Fed which has adopted an implicit
low ination target. This leaves little scope for the Federal government to
raise unanticipated seigniorage revenues through the ination tax.27 Third,
historically, the contribution of ination to the U.S. budget decit has been
negligible, see King (1995) and Woodford (1996). The real rate rbt captures
the impact of ination on payments to bondholders. This too has made little
contribution to the U.S. budget decit since the 1970s, see Hall and Sargent
(2011).
Like Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010, 2011) and the baseline analysis of Bi
(2011), the model does not incorporate a default risk premium in rbt . In principle,
27The e¤ects of anticipated ination are implicitly accounted for in the ROVAR forecast of
the debt-GDP ratio.
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as the probability of default approaches close to unity - but not before - it may be
expected that purchasers of government debt would demand a risk premium.28
As this would increase the cost of borrowing close to default, it would also
lower the debt-GDP limit. In practice, because according to the model the
probability of sovereign default by the U.S. is close to zero, this adjustment is
unnecessary. Although for the U.S. we may ignore such considerations of risk
in the theoretical model of the debt-GDP limit, the debt-GDP ratio and the
interest rate forecasted from the VAR are not constrained in this way. The use
of ad-hoc debt-GDP limits in section 6 is, of course, free from this problem.
In stationary equilibrium, the debt-GDP ratio implied by (10) is:
b
y
IGBCL
=
1


v
y
  g
y
  z
y

; (14)
where  = rb   , with rb = ib   , is the output-adjusted real rate of return
on government bonds. The maximum debt-GDP ratio sustainable under distor-
tionary taxation is obtained at the peak of the La¤er hill associated with tax
rates on labor and capital income alone. The consumption tax rate is held at its
current level since in a standard real business cycle model the tax revenue gen-
erated by the consumption tax increases monotonically with the consumption
tax rate, implying that there is no interior maximum.29 For this reason Davig,
Leeper and Walker (2010) exclude consumption taxation from their model on
the debt limit; and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) look only at La¤er curves gen-
erated by taxation of income from labor and capital.
Appendix C shows that assuming
u (ct; 1  nt) = log ct +  log (1  nt) ;
the rst-order conditions for households and rms imply that the steady-state
value of tax revenues as a proportion of GDP (the average tax rate) can be
computed as:
v
y
=  c

1
'k
  1

+ n (1  ) + k
"
1  

 1   1
1  k + 
 1#
; (15)
28To illustrate, in order for the expected pay-o¤ when the probability of default next period
is p to be the same as when the probability is zero, the risk premium  must satisfy 1 + rb =
(1 + rb + )(1  p) giving a risk premium of  = p(1+rb)
1 p , where r
b is the risk-free return.
29Similarly, ination has no interior maximum when introduced in a general equilibrium
model using a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption expenditure. For further discussion
on this see Chiari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996).
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where
 =
(1  N )
 (1 + C)
(1  ) (16)
k =
+ (1 +  c)g
[(1 +  c)
 + ']
(17)
 =
1
 
(1  n) (1  )A'  (18)

 = A'1     (19)
' =
"
 1   1 +   1  k
A (1  k)
# 1
1 
: (20)
Substituting equation (15) into (14) gives the steady-state debt-GDP limit
implied by the IGBC in (10). To implement a time-varying version of this
debt-GDP limit, we employ time-varying values of the steady-state levels of the
three tax rates  c, n and k, and the expenditure processes for gy and
z
y . These
steady-state values are estimated by their rolling-window means and hence form
a time-series. Further detail is given in appendix D (see steps 2 - 4 in particular).
The steady-state debt-GDP limit corresponding to (11) is derived as
b
y
NDL
=
1

v
y
(21)
where vy is still calculated from (15). The time-varying version of this debt-GDP
limit is calculated using rolling-window means of the three tax rates  c, n and
k. The steady-state debt-GDP limit corresponding to (12) is
b
y
FL
=
1


vmax
y
  g
y
  z
y

(22)
where
vmax
y
=  c

1
'k
  1

+ n;max (1  ) + k;max
"
1  

 1   1
1  k + 
 1#
is the maximum steady-state revenue-GDP ratio obtained by the government
through distortionary taxation. This is implemented by using the time-varying
steady state value of  c and the time-varying maximum levels of n;max and
k;max. The steady-state equivalent of equation (13) is obtained by setting
g
y =
z
y = 0 in (22) to give
b
y
MDL
=
1

vmax
y
: (23)
We note that since the debt-GDP limits are based on the stationary equi-
librium solution, they would be una¤ected if the model above is extended to
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include nominal (price and wages) rigidities, imperfect competition in the pro-
duction sector, and the maturity structure of government debt. These changes
would impact on the short-term dynamics of the endogenous variables, but not
on the determinants of the steady-state debt-GDP limits in equation (14), (21),
(22) and (23). We also note that the analysis of debt limits is not unconnected
with the literature on scal sustainability. The latter focuses on the intertem-
poral budget constraint (IGBC), the measure of the debt limit, which is based
on extrapolating the anticipated scal policy stance. The other debt limits take
account potential changes in the scal stance designed to increase the borrowing
capacity above the levels predicted by the IGBC.
7.3 Evolution of debt-GDP limits
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Fig. 5. Left panel: Components of the U.S. government budget; rolling
window (10-year) means of government expenditure-GDP ratio gtyt ,
transfers-GDP ratio ztyt , actual revenue-GDP ratio
vt
yt
and maximum
revenue-GDP ratio vtyt
max. Right panel: evolution of debt limits. 1969:4 to
2011:2.
Quarterly time series of debt-GDP limits for the period 1969:4-2011:2 are
obtained through numerical simulation of the model in section 6.2. These data
are generated from steady-state values of the ratios of government expenditure
to GDP and transfers to GDP, technological progress and actual tax rates using
40-period rolling window of sample means. Time-varying volatility is introduced
by simulating the stochastic processes of the ratios of government expenditure
to GDP and transfers to GDP and technological progress from AR(1) processes
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driven by shocks with time-varying volatility using a 40-period rolling window of
sample standard deviations derived from the original data. All other parameters
are calibrated on an annual basis using standard values for the U.S. The Markov
Chain Monte Carlo algorithm used for the simulation is described in Appendix
D. As a result, in each period, we obtain a distribution of the debt-GDP limit.
The di¤erences between the four measures of the steady state debt-GDP limits
depend on the evolution of their main components.
Rolling window means of the ratios of government expenditure to GDP,
transfers to GDP, tax revenues to GDP and the maximum revenue to GDP are
shown in the left-panel of Figure 7 for the sample period 1969:4-2011:2. While
government transfers show a slight upward trend, government expenditures and
both measures of the tax revenues have remained relatively stable. Higher
government transfers lower the debt-GDP limits obtained from (10) and (12),
but do not a¤ect those from (11) and (13). As government expenditures, actual
and maximum tax revenues are relatively stable over this sample period, we
would expect the debt-GDP limits from (10) and (12) to decline over time, and
those from (11) and (13) to be relatively stable. The steady-state values of the
four debt-GDP limits are shown in the right-panel of Figure 7 for the period
1969:4-2011:2. The four measures give a very di¤erent picture of the likely
evolution of the borrowing capacity of the U.S. economy. The highest debt-
GDP limit is given by by
MDL
in which the debt limit is on average 7:5 times U.S.
GDP. The next highest is by
NDL
on average 5:7 times the U.S. GDP. Both by
MDL
and by
NDL
are relatively stable over the sample period. This is consistent with
the relative stability of the actual and maximum ratios of tax revenue to GDP.
In contrast, the other two debt-GDP limits, by
FL
and by
IGBCL
are lower and
decline over time due to the upward trend in the ratio of government transfers to
GDP. These results highlight several practical issues in measuring the debt-GDP
limit from the macroeconomic theory. The average debt-GDP limit obtained
from the IGBC is only 0.56 and becomes negative in the last 10 quarters of
the sample. The empirical results in section 5, based on the ad-hoc default
thresholds, suggest that this denition of the debt-GDP limit would imply a U.S.
sovereign credit rating of speculative grade (or possibly C) throughout most of
the sample period and therefore is unsuitable. Davig, Leeper and Walker (2010)
argue that the scal limit derived from (12) may overstate the true debt-GDP
limit since governments would face increasing political pressures as they increase
taxes in order to reach the peak of the La¤er hill.30 Similar considerations
apply to the debt-GDP limits implied by (11) and (13), not least because their
empirical estimates appear to be even more implausible. Nevertheless, it is still
of interest to compute the sovereign credit rating associated with these measures
of the maximum borrowing capacity.
30 It is also true, however, that the same debt-GDP limit can be achieved through an ap-
propriate scal policy mix including government expenditure cuts as well as increasing taxes.
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Fig. 6. Standard deviations of the distribution of the debt limits for the U.S.
economy, 1969:4-2011:4.
Figure 8 plots the time-varying volatilities (standard deviation) of the four
debt limits. These show how uncertainty surrounding the measurement of the
maximum borrowing capacity of the U.S. economy has changed over time. This
volatility uctuates markedly over time. The increase in uncertainty surround-
ing the borrowing capacity of the U.S. economy during the latest nancial crisis
is even greater. The volatilities of the four debt limits move similarly. IGBCL is
more volatile than NDL because it includes the e¤ect on the borrowing capacity
of government expenditure, which is excluded from NDL. This is also why FL
is more volatile than MDL. FL and MDL have the largest volatilities due to the
greater uncertainty of unanticipated than anticipated tax revenues.
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Fig. 7. State-dependent probability density functions (PDFs) and
cumulative density functions (CDFs) of the scal limit by
FL
at di¤erent points
of the 1969:4-2011:2 sample period.
These results indicate signicant shifts and changes in the shape over time in
the distributions of the four debt limits. Figure 9 shows the probability density
functions (PDFs) and cumulative density functions (CDFs) of the debt limits
at six di¤erent points in time.31 The distributions shift to the left over time,
thereby lowering the average debt-GDP limit. The largest shifts occurred during
the 1970s and in the latest nancial crisis. Changes in dispersion of the PDFs,
reecting time-varying volatility in the shocks, are also evident, with the greatest
dispersion occurring in the 1970s and since the year 2007. The CDFs measure
the probability of sovereign default (i.e. the probability that the debt-GDP
ratio is above the scal limit in equation (22)) over di¤erent values of the debt-
GDP ratio. The state of the economy at the time has a clear impact on this
probability. For example, throughout the whole period 1969:4-2007:1 and with
a debt-GDP of 150%, the probability of default at every point has been zero,
but by 2011 it reached about 5%.32
7.4 Credit rating
31Similar results can be observed for the other three debt limits; these are omitted for reason
of space but they are available upon request from the authors.
32Using a microfounded model with xed parameters, time-invariant volatilities, and cal-
ibrated using average data for 8 advanced countries, Bi (2011) nds that the average scal
limit is close to the 150 per cent debt-GDP threshold we compute for the U.S. by the end of
the sample period.
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Fig. 8. Model-based U.S. sovereign credit rating for di¤erent time horizons
and under the scal limit (FL), natural debt limit (NDL) and maxumum debt
limit (MDL).
We now recalculate the U.S. sovereign credit rating for the period 1969:4-
2011:2 over 1, 5 and 10-year horizons based on the mean values of the FL,
NDL and MDL theoretical debt-GDP limits and on the average default prob-
ability for the whole 10-year period. The results are shown in Figure 10. The
corresponding letter ratings are reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Like the model-based credit ratings based on ad hoc limits, those based on
theoretical limits exhibit deeper and more prolonged downgrades as the time-
horizon increases and the debt limit becomes more stringent than the historic
ratings. We nd, rst, that throughout the whole sample period over a short
time horizon the credit rating is Prime-1 credit rating regardless of the choice of
the debt limit (top-left panel). Second, in mid-1974, regardless of the choice of
the debt limit, under any horizon longer than 5 year, the model-based credit rat-
ing is downgraded by two notches from triple-A. The duration of the downgrade
is relatively short as the triple-A rating is restored by 1974:4. Third, over the
10-year horizon (bottom-left panel) the credit rating is downgraded from triple-
A by 1 notch and for 1 quarter in 1992:2, 1993:1 and 1997:2. Fourth, under any
horizon longer than 5 year and regardless of the choice of debt limit, during the
latest nancial crisis the triple-A rating is downgraded. For the 5-year horizon,
when using the FL, the U.S. credit rating is downgraded from triple-A in the
last quarter of 2008, it reaches its lowest level (A1) in 2009:3 and the triple-A
rating is restored by 2012:3. When using the NDL and MDL the triple-A rating
is still reduced by one notch in the early part of 2009. Under the 10-year horizon
and the FL, the model-based credit rating is downgraded from triple-A rst by
one notch in 2008:2 and subsequently by 5 notches from 2008:4 to 2009:4; by
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Table 2
Model-based U.S. sovereign credit rating.
Date FL Date NDL Date MDL Date FL Date NDL Date MDL
Short-term (1-year ahead) Long-term (10-year ahead)
69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa
Medium-term (5-year ahead) 74:1 Aa1 74:1 Aa1 74:1 Aa1
69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 74:2 Aa2 74:2 Aa2 74:2 Aa2
74:1 Aa1 74:1 Aa1 74:1 Aa1 74:3 Aa1 74:3 Aa1 74:3 Aa1
74:2 Aa2 74:2 Aa2 74:2 Aa2 74:4 Aaa 74:4 Aaa 74:4 Aaa
74:3 Aa1 74:3 Aa1 74:3 Aa1 92:2 Aa1 08:4 Aa1 08:4 Aa1
74:4 Aaa 74:4 Aaa 74:4 Aaa 92:3 Aaa 09:1 Aa2 09:1 Aa2
08:4 Aa1 09:1 Aa1 09:1 Aa1 93:1 Aa1 09:2 Aa3 09:2 Aa3
09:1 Aa2 09:3 Aaa 09:2 Aaa 93:2 Aaa 09:3 A1 09:3 A1
09:2 Aa3 97:2 Aa1 09:4 Aa3 09:4 Aa3
09:3 A1 97:4 Aaa 10:1 Aa2 10:1 Aa2
09:4 Aa3 08:2 Aa1 10:2 Aa1 10:2 Aa1
10:1 Aa2 08:3 Aaa 10:3 Aaa 10:3 Aaa
10:2 Aa1 08:4 Aa1
10:3 Aaa 09:1 Aa2
09:2 Aa3
09:3 A1
09:4 A2
10:1 A1
10:2 Aa3
10:3 Aa2
10:4 Aa1
This table reports the model-based measure of the U.S. sovereign credit rating. The rating is calcu-
lated (i) considering the cumulative default probability over the 1, 5 and 10-year horizons and (ii)
for three alternative measures of the debt limit: the scal limit (FL), natural debt limit (NDL) and
maxumum debt limit (MDL).
the end of the sample the triple-A rating is not restored. When using the NDL
and MDL, the downgrades start in 2008:4 and continue to reach A1 by 2009:3
before recovering the triple-A mark in 2010:3. Fifth, when using the average
default probability over the 10-year horizon (bottom-right panel and Table 3),
the credit rating is lowered from triple-A only in 1974 and during the latest
nancial crisis.
8 Summary and conclusions
8.1 Methodology
This paper has proposed a model-based measure of a countrys sovereign credit
rating based solely on its ability to meet its nancial obligations using scal
policy. Such a measure is suited to a country that is strongly committed to
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Table 3
Model-based U.S. sovereign credit rating.
Date FL Date NDL Date MDL
Average over 10-year horizon
69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa 69:4 Aaa
74:1 Aa1 74:1 Aa1 74:1 Aa1
74:2 Aa2 74:2 Aa2 74:2 Aa2
74:3 Aa1 74:3 Aa1 74:3 Aa1
74:4 Aaa 74:4 Aaa 74:4 Aaa
08:2 Aa1 08:4 Aa1 08:4 Aa1
08:3 Aaa 09:1 Aa2 09:1 Aa2
08:4 Aa1 09:2 Aa3 09:2 Aa3
09:1 Aa2 09:3 A1 09:3 A1
09:2 Aa3 09:4 Aa3 09:4 Aa3
09:3 A1 10:1 Aa2 10:1 Aa2
09:4 A2 10:2 Aa1 10:2 Aa1
10:1 A1 10:3 Aaa 10:3 Aaa
10:2 Aa3
10:3 Aa2
10:4 Aa1
11:1 Aaa
This table reports the model-based measure of the
U.S. sovereign credit rating. The rating is calculated
considering the average cumulative default probabil-
ity over the 10-year horizon and (ii) for three alterna-
tive measures of the debt limit: the scal limit (FL),
natural debt limit (NDL) and maxumum debt limit
(MDL).
achieving an ination target such as most developed economies and, in particu-
lar, the United States and countries in the E.U. It is less suited to countries that
might choose to inate away their debt, a course of action that some emerging
market economies might prefer. The analysis does not explain the di¤erence
between the model-based and the o¢ cial credit ratings provided by the CRAs.
The latter takes account of additional factors to those involved in determining
scal savings, in particular, political considerations which may a¤ect a countrys
willingness to pay, and its unwillingness to default.
The proposed measure estimates the probability that a countrys debt-GDP
ratio will exceed a given limit during a given time horizon and maps this into
a credit rating using Moodys historic records on sovereign default probability
and credit ratings. The measure requires a forecast of the debt-GDP ratio
and its forecast-error variance, together with an assessment of the debt-GDP
limit beyond which default is deemed to occur. The forecasts can be derived
from either a structural or a reduced-form economic model. We have chosen
to use a VAR as it has been found to forecast at least as well as a typical
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DSGE model, and is much easier to implement. The VAR we have used has
two desirable features: it includes variables that make it consistent with the
government budget constraint, the key determinant of debt, and it allows for
structural change in the economy through time-variation both in the parameters
and in volatility. We have suggested that a simple way to estimate such a VAR,
that reproduces features usually captured by more complex estimation methods,
is by rolling-window estimation (i.e. a ROVAR).
How to determine the debt-GDP limit is more problematic. We have consid-
ered two possibilities: the use of ad-hoc limits and limits derived from macroeco-
nomic theory that are based either on anticipated or on unanticipated changes
in future scal policy. The former implies that the debt-GDP limits must satisfy
a governments intertemporal budget constraint. The latter yields three weaker
denitions of the debt-GDP limits, depending whether government expenditure
is reduced to the minimum (NDL), or tax revenue is increased to the maximum
(FL) or both (MDL). Each of these is implemented empirically by simulating a
DSGE model that is calibrated to the U.S. economy.
8.2 Main ndings
A number of factors a¤ect the probability of default and hence the credit rat-
ings. In particular, the lower the debt limit, the longer the time horizon and the
greater is macroeconomic uncertainty as measured by the volatility of macroeco-
nomic shocks, the higher is the probability of default and hence the likelihood
that the model will determine a reduction of the credit rating.
During the period from 1969:4 - 2011:2 the U.S. experienced two major oil
crises, six macroeconomic recessions, an unprecedented banking crisis and sig-
nicant domestic scal reforms, yet throughout U.S. Treasury securities received
the highest credit-quality rating by all of the CRAs. Our measure, which fo-
cuses solely on scal considerations and hence is more narrowly based than the
o¢ cial ratings, is more sensitive to these events as it identies at least two clear
episodes over the past 40 years in which U.S. debt would have been downgraded:
the rst coincides with the oil crisis starting in October 1973; the second with
the period after the collapse of IndyMac Bank and Lehman Brothers. These
results are generally robust to the specication of the debt-GDP limit, whether
ad-hoc or theoretical. The downgrade in the early 1970s is by two notches and
lasts for two to three quarters; during the latest nancial crisis the extent and
duration of the downgrade predicted by the model varies with the debt-GDP
limit and the time horizon, but never falls as far as speculative grade.
A by-product of our analysis is the insight provided of the borrowing ca-
pacity of an economy through the estimation of theoretical debt-GDP limits.
Temporary reductions in the limit are often associated with economic crises and
large increases in government expenditures as in the U.S. in the early 1970s and
late 2000s. They also contributed to the credit downgrades. More permanent
reductions in the limit - as in the U.S. over the last 40 years due in large part
to a steady increase in government transfers as a proportion of GDP - may
signicantly erode a governments borrowing capacity and hence jeopardize its
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ability to maintain a Aaa rating indenitely.
8.3 Assessment
One of the aims of this paper was to show how it is possible to derive sovereign
ratings in a simple, transparent and relative inexpensive way. The results are
very encouraging for those who wish to calculate their own credit ratings on a
frequent basis.
Nonetheless, the procedure is mechanical and does not take into account sev-
eral potentially important considerations which cause the markets to be either
more or less fearful of sovereign default. Principal among these is the underly-
ing political context. It may, for example, be politically infeasible to attain a
debt-GDP limit due to the degree of scal austerity entailed. Further, default-
ing is a policy instrument and it may be optimal to default before reaching the
debt-GDP limit.
The analysis of debt limits has focused on the use of scal policy and has
excluded the use of higher ination to erode the real burden of government
debt. This seems appropriate for the U.S. and for most OECD countries who
adhere to ination targeting, but may be less appropriate for countries that are
willing to inate away their nominal domestic-currency denominated liabilities
which many emerging market countries may prefer. We note, however, that
although higher U.S. ination may raise its debt limit, our model-based measure
downgrades for 1974 and following the collapse of Lehman occur both under ad-
hoc limits and the highly implausible MDL debt limit.
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